The aim of this paper is to empirically investigate the determinants of creditor concentration in the use of bank loans by firms in a European cross-country framework. We analyze the influence of loan and borrower characteristics but also banking market structure and legal enforcement country-specific variables that are expected to influence the financial and strategic decision relative to the number of bank lenders. We find that firms tend to diversify sources of financing by reducing bank concentration when their level of quality is higher and both asymmetric information and the risk of early liquidation are minimal (larger, older, transparent, liquid and profitable firms). Furthermore, lenders' monitoring appears to be an important feature of lending concentration, particularly in order to prevent private benefits extraction by insiders in legal environment where shareholders benefit from better protections.
INTRODUCTION
This paper contributes to the empirical literature investigating the determinants of bank lending concentration in Europe. Multiple banking is a significant economic phenomenon in all developed economies, as more than 85 percent of firms borrow from more than one bank and, on average, a borrower has more than five bank lending relationships (Ongena and Smith 2000) 2 .
Furthermore, bank borrowing is usually unequal and asymmetric as the average HirschmanHerfindhal normalized index equals 34% in Europe, ranging from 28% in the Netherlands to 66%
in Poland
3
A potential response to these various problems and associated costs is an unequal, asymmetric and concentrated bank lending. Such lending structure can mitigate coordination failure and renegotiation risk, as well as agency problems between lenders, such as free riding in screening and monitoring. Indeed, (Elsas, Heinemann, and Tyrell 2004) show that multi-banking can mitigate coordination problems, as German firms with low expected cash flows or with lower liquidation value of assets prefer concentrated financing. (Guiso and Minetti 2004) find that
Italian firms with more valuable and redeployable assets deal with lower lenders concentration in order to prevent unsound firms from defaulting. In a recent contribution, (Ongena et al. 2008) show that concentration is smaller when the borrower is risky, illiquid, large and leveraged, while it is larger when the firm is more profitable.
. From the borrower perspective, a key explanation for multiple banking is the mitigation of the hold-up problem of long-term relationship lending and thus the diversification of financing sources (Rajan 1992) . In crisis periods, especially when "credit crunch" episodes are strong, like recently, multiple banking is also relevant for firms to diversify their financial stakeholders and to limit the risk of illiquidity from banking origin (Detragiache, Garella and Guiso 2000). Furthermore, banks can also gain from multiple banking to tackle limited lending capacities (Carletti, Cerasi, and Daltung 2007) and to diversify loans portfolio risk. However, the drawback of multiple banking is notably the potential coordination failure problem and renegotiation risk in case of borrower distress (Bolton and Scharfstein 1996; Bris and Welch 2005) .
2 See also (Godlewski and Ziane 2008) for recent empirical evidence on multi-banking in Europe.
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In addition to that empirical banking literature, we propose to investigate which determinants drive lenders concentration in a European cross-country framework. Furthermore, we extend previous research by analyzing loan and borrower characteristics, but also economic characteristics such as banking market structure and legal environment that are expected to influence lenders concentration.
Using a sample of almost 2700 loans to European borrowers, we find that bank lending is less concentrated when the borrower is larger, older and more transparent, as well as when he is more leveraged, liquid, and profitable. Hence, borrowers with better quality are financed by more diffused lending, following arguments relating such lending structure to mitigating early project liquidation and to reducing agency problems. Furthermore, banking market concentration and shareholders protection imply more concentrated lending.
The reminder of the article is organized as follows. The theoretical background and hypotheses are discussed in section 2. Section 3 presents the empirical design. Results are discussed in section 4. Finally, we provide our conclusions in section 5.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS
Classical theories of financial intermediation first focused on the necessity for firms, especially SMEs, to maintain one bank lending relationship to enhance benefits in terms of funds availability, notably. However, theoretical contributions show that a single financial partnership could be harmful for firms because it enables banks to accrue monopoly rents (Sharpe 1990) .
Hence, multiple banking may be efficient to reduce informational rents and consequently cost of capital, but at the expense of switching costs (Klemperer 1987) , duplication of information costs (von Thadden 1992) and less viable monitoring (Carletti 2004) . With regards to borrower's distress, multiple creditors may reduce the probability and costs associated with default, as they harden the budget constraint for managers, thus decreasing strategic default (Dewatripont and Maskin 1995; Bolton and Scharfstein 1996) and reduce inefficient liquidation (Bris and Welch 2005) . Furthermore, numerous bank relationships serve as an insurance against credit crunch and illiquidity risks from banking origin (Detragiache, Garella, and Guiso 2000).
However, in the case of borrower's default, the drawback of multiple bank lending is the coordination failure problem. Therefore, asymmetric lending or creditors' concentration can play a crucial role in balancing the holdup problem of relationship lending with the coordination failure of multiple lending. In other words, these conflicting forces regarding the advantage of creditor's concentration can prompt firms to establish multiple but asymmetric banking relationships. In that way, the main bank allow the borrower to retain some of the benefits of long-term relationship lending while the presence of less informed "arm's length" banks can be viewed as insurance against illiquidity risk originated from the main bank. The holdup costs which arise from a lock-in by main and better informed banks are expected to be particularly relevant for opaque firms, which thus have an incentive to develop multiple and diffuse banking relationships. Furthermore, weaker concentration can be motivated by risk and monitoring costs sharing for lenders, in particular for smaller and younger firms which are considered as more opaque and bearing larger specific risk. Following (Berglof and von Thadden 1994) , the choice of financial contracts is determined as a trade-off between, on the one hand, the desire to discourage ex post renegotiation (strategic default) and, on the other hand, the wish to limit inefficient liquidation when the firm is cash 
Hypothesis 2: Lenders' concentration increases with greater ownership concentration.
Other theoretical explanations of creditors' concentration can yield further hypotheses about the influence of loan characteristics, as well as economic conditions such as the structure of the banking market and the legal environment in a law and finance framework.
Greater maturity is associated with greater monitoring costs as long-term loans incur control of guarantee and covenant costs. Furthermore, if we consider a positive relationship between maturity and credit risk (Flannery 1986 ), lenders' concentration should be stronger to enhance monitoring efforts and prevent free-riding, as well as to resolve potential borrower distress more efficiently. The presence of guarantees in the loan contract may solve the problem of adverse selection thanks to the better information owned by the borrower in comparison to the bank before the lending decision. Therefore, high-quality borrowers have incentives to show their quality, using a credible signal, one that cannot be provided by low-quality borrowers. Guarantee or collateral is such a signal, as it is more costly for low-quality borrowers since they have a higher chance of defaulting and hence of losing the collateral (Bester 1985; Besanko and Thakor 1987) . Furthermore, restricting the discretionary power of the borrower and thus moral hazard problems through covenants can reduce the risk of loan default (Rajan and Winton, 1995) and enhances the ability to monitor the borrower.
Hypothesis 3: Lenders' concentration increases when guarantees and covenants are absent in the loan contract and when the loan maturity is longer.
Market concentration leads to market power and thus lower supply and higher prices. However, recent evidence shows that competition and bank are not necessarily inimical (Degryse and Ongena 2007) . In a seminal contribution, (Ongena and Smith 2000) show that countries with a high banking market concentration have fewer banking relationships.
Hypothesis 4: Lenders' concentration increases when the banking market is less concentrated and more cost efficient.
Lenders' concentration is also expected to depend on the legal environment, which determines the protection of creditors as well as law enforcement. In countries where creditor protection is weak, the cost of strategic default is low. In that case, proper discipline can be implemented through the level of creditors' concentration. Indeed, (Ongena and Smith 2000) find that more diffuse lending is related to stronger creditor protection. However, a more efficient bankruptcy procedure with adequate law enforcement may decrease lenders' concentration because it reduces the costs of lending for a given bank. Furthermore, in countries with low shareholders' protection, the difficulty in raising external finance should induce firms to maintain relations with a small number of long-term investors who screen the firm's investment opportunities and really monitor its management (Rajan and Zingales 1998).
Hypothesis 5: Lenders' concentration increases when creditors' and shareholders' rights law enforcement are weaker.
After having drawn from the existing literature our main testable hypotheses on the determinants of lender concentration, we now turn to the description of the empirical design of the paper. Independence and Shareholders are the proxy variables taking borrower's ownership structure into account, in order to empirically test hypothesis 2. The former is an index characterizing the degree of independence of a company with regard to its shareholders (A: strong independence to 9 D), while the latter is the number of shareholders of the firm. According to hypothesis 2, we expect a negative sign for both of these variables.
EMPIRICAL DESIGN

DATA AND VARIABLES
We also take loan characteristics into account through seven variables related to main terms of the loan agreement. Loan size is the logarithm of the loan facility amount and should be negatively related to lenders concentration because of risk diversification and sharing purposes.
The maturity of the loan is in months, while the presence of guarantors and of financial covenants is taken into account through dummies. Following hypothesis 3, we expect lenders concentration to increase with the absence of guarantors and covenants, and with loan maturity. We also control for the main loan type (Revolver) and purpose (Debt repayment) through the inclusion of dummies in our regressions. Finally, we also take the fact that the loan is syndicated into account with the Syndication dummy. The expected signs for the loan type and purpose variables are a matter of empirical results. We can advocate that revolving loans might need more intense monitoring and thus imply a concentrated lending. Syndicated loans should be funded with a more diffuse lending structure because of the specific nature of the syndication market where numerous lenders are expected to participate.
Our third set of variables takes economic characteristics of the borrower country into account in order to test hypotheses 4 and 5. Market concentration and Bank costs are two proxies for the banking market structure, equal to the assets of the three largest banks as a share of all commercial banks and to the ratio of bank overhead costs to total assets respectively. We expect a positive sign for both of these variables, according to hypothesis 4. Creditor rights, Shareholders rights, and Rule of law are three proxies for the legal environment in the borrower country. These are indexes aggregating creditors' and shareholders' rights, as well as assessing the law and order tradition. According to hypothesis 5, we expect the creditor and shareholder rights indexes to have negative signs, while the influence of the rule of law on lenders concentration remains a matter of empirical results. Indeed, both signs can be expected, as better law and order tradition can allow for more diffuse lending structure because of lower legal risk regarding borrower's distress handling and loan agreement re-contracting. However, it can also imply greater lenders concentration in order to improve screening and monitoring of potentially lazy lenders who might rely more on the legal environment enforcement than on their own capacities. Finally, we control for the development of the credit market through the Credit development variable (ratio of private credit of deposit banks and other financial institutions to GDP).
We also control for the fact that a borrower is from Eastern Europe, where different economic, financial and legal environment might drive the lending structure. We expect the dummy Eastern
Europe to have a positive sign because of greater opacity of such borrowers, implying a greater concentration of lenders. Finally, we control through dummies the year of loan activation and the industry sector of the borrower. Regarding borrower characteristics, we observe that firms are on average relatively large and mature (size above 3 millions USD and age above 14 years), with satisfactory liquidity and profitability (ratios close to 100% and 13%, respectively) and weakly leveraged (close to 2).
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND METHODOLOGY
Almost 1 out of 4 firms is quoted on the Euronext list, with a medium independence towards shareholders (above B), who are relatively numerous (close to 40). Finally, 25% of the borrowers are from Eastern Europe.
. The average loan facility equals 573 thousands USD for a maturity of 7.5 years. These loans have rarely a guarantor or financial covenants (12.8% and 7%, respectively) and are mostly revolving facilities funding debt repayment (78.8% and 81.2%, respectively).
Finally, banking markets are quite concentrated on average (75.8%) but cost efficient (ratio of overhead costs to total assets equals 3%), while credit markets are developed (private credit ratio to GDP equals 81.2%). On average, creditors are rather poorly protected (index equals 1.4) while shareholders benefit from an 'intermediate' protection (index equals 2.4), with very strong rule of law (index equals 9.8).
5 (Ongena et al. 2008 ) find that lenders concentration in Germany ranges on average between 53% and 64%.
The breakdown of the average lenders concentration by main explanatory variables involved in testing our hypothesis is provided in table 2   6 . We remark that hypothesis 1a is validated (except for the opacity argument) as larger and older firms have on average greater lenders concentration.
Regarding hypothesis 1b, only the argument regarding profitability holds, while we would reject that hypothesis with respect to leverage and liquidity. With respect to hypothesis 2, we remark that lenders concentration is stronger when there are fewer shareholders, although stronger independence of the firm towards its shareholders is related to a lower lenders concentration. We also observe that the absence of guarantor and covenants is related to greater concentration, as expected in hypothesis 3, although the argument on maturity is not validated by the data. Finally, hypothesis 4 is partially validated as lenders are more concentrated when bank cost efficiency is higher, but it is less concentrated when banking market concentration is higher. This univariate analysis confirms, at least partially, several of our hypotheses. Nevertheless, a multivariate analysis is needed to take all the hypotheses into account.
To investigate the influence of borrower, loan and economic characteristics on lenders concentration in Europe and to test our hypothesis, we use Tobit regressions (with standard errors clustered at the loan level) as the explained variable is bounded between 0 and 1. The main equation of interest can be summarized as follows:
RESULTS
We perform series of regression on the full sample with four different specifications: borrower and loan characteristics only, and then we progressively add banking market structure characteristics, creditor rights protection and finally shareholder rights protection 7 6 A breakdown using the median of Creditor rights, Shareholder rights and Rule of law wouldn't be very consistent as these indexes are quite homogenous in our sample.
.
7
Due to the correlation structure, we cannot introduce all economic characteristics in the same regression.
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The results for the four specifications on the full sample are provided in table 3. We remark that the specification with creditor rights (3) has the lowest statistical quality with respect to the Fisher statistic, while the specification with shareholders rights index (4) has the largest one.
Regarding borrowers' characteristics, we conclude that both hypotheses 1a and 1b are rejected, although the results of the univariate analysis were validating these hypotheses (table 2) . More precisely, larger, older and transparent firms are funded by less concentrated lenders, and this result is consistent across all of the specifications. Riskier (in term of leverage) and more profitable borrowers are funded by a more diffuse lenders' structure, while liquidity has a different influence on lenders concentration depending on the specification. When taking economic characteristics into account, concentration is negatively influenced by borrower liquidity, while the impact is positive when taking individual characteristics only into account. As the statistical quality of the model is larger when more characteristics are taken into account, we conclude that liquidity is negatively related to lenders concentration.
Avoiding holdup costs by the borrower or sharing risk and monitoring costs by the lenders doesn't explain these results. Also, the argument relative to the value of lenders concentration as a signal of borrower quality regarding strategic default and bankruptcy risk doesn't fit the results.
The only arguments that could fit follow (Detragiache, Garella, and Guiso 2000), where a diffuse lending structure mitigates project early liquidation in case of lenders distress. Furthermore, such a lending structure could also mitigate the opportunistic behavior or excessive risk taking by the borrower if he anticipates easy renegotiation of debt contracts. Nevertheless, our results are partially in line with (Elsas, Heinemann, and Tyrell 2004; Guiso and Minetti 2004) .
As to borrower's ownership structure influence, we remark that more independent firms are funded by diffuse lenders while the impact of the number of shareholders is varying with the specification used. It is negative in specification (1) with individual characteristics only, but becomes positive when taking bank market structure into account (2). However, the effect of ownership structure variables on lenders concentration vanishes away when taking more economic characteristics into account, especially the ones controlling for creditors' and shareholders' rights protection. Hence, we partially accept hypothesis 2, thus validating the argument related to a trade-off between managerial discipline and initiative, following (MahrtSmith 2005) and the role of lending structure in performing greater aggregate monitoring. We also remark that lending is more concentrated when the borrower is located in an Eastern
European country, as expected, due to greater opacity of firms on these markets.
Turning to loan characteristics, we conclude that hypothesis 3 is overall validated, as the coefficient signs for Guarantor and Covenants are significantly negative across specifications.
Thus, these loan agreement features act as signals of borrower quality and as devices reducing adverse selection and moral hazard problems, following (Bester 1985; Besanko and Thakor 1987) , and (Rajan and Winton 1995), and hence, allows a more diffuse lending structure. Loan maturity has no significant influence on lenders concentration. Larger and syndicated loans are usually associated to more diffuse lending for risk sharing and diversification reasons.
Regarding economic characteristics, hypothesis 4 is not validated as banking market concentration has a significant and positive influence on lenders concentration, while Bank costs has no significant effect. In some sense, it seems that lenders replicate the market structure where the borrower is located, and greater market power is associated with greater concentration in lending.
Finally, among the stakeholders' rights, only shareholders' index has a significant and positive impact on lenders concentration. This result partially invalidates hypothesis 5 and do not confirm the arguments developed by (Rajan and Zingales 1998). This apparently surprising result can be explained following recent evidence provided by (Volpin 2001) . This author shows that firm's entrepreneur chooses more bank monitoring in countries with better investor protection because the benefits of this type monitoring is greater, as it prevents private benefits extraction by firm's managers. This explanation fits our empirical results.
Overall, lending concentration in Europe is lower when borrowers' quality is greater (older, larger and more transparent firms, which are profitable and liquid), fitting theoretical arguments linking bank lending structure to mitigation of early project liquidation. We also observe such a diffuse lending structure when the loan contract involves guarantees and covenants, which serve as signals of counterparty quality and reduce agency problems. Lenders' monitoring appears to be important as the influence of borrower's independency towards its shareholders reflects a trade-off between managerial discipline and initiative. Furthermore, bank monitoring becomes more useful to prevent private benefits extraction by managers in legal environment where shareholders benefit from a better protection, as the latter increases lenders' concentration.
CONCLUSION
During the last decade, financial behaviors involving frequently bank switching became the rule rather than the exception. In this paper, we tried to understand the main influences of variables relative to borrowers, loans and banking and legal variables on the degree of lenders concentration. Retail banking activities are financial but first of all strategic. Due to asymmetric information problems ex-ante, modifying prices for loans could not be an efficient solution for banks to limit their exposition to default risk. However, the "book-keeping" function and customer relationship management allows financial intermediaries to distinguish risk profiles and transaction buyers from relationship buyers. Conversely, firms and especially smallest and opaque ones face hard difficulties to obtain loans due to their lack of transparency. Our results on a large European panel of firms demonstrated that tangible information is determinant to be able to deal with multiple financial partners and benefit from associated benefits in terms of costs and credit availability. From the borrower point of view, the recent financial crisis put into light that illiquidity and early liquidation risks from banking origin are real and socially costly in terms of bankruptcy and job destruction, notably. Recent European discussion regarding the necessity to promote bank mobility for individuals and firms in all countries are welcoming because banking industry still concentrated. 
